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Congress has passed sweeping new legislation
aimed at making credit cards safer and more
transparent, but Americans are still waiting for the
new law to protect them. Although the president
signed the Credit CARD Act of 2009 last May, most
parts of the bill will not take effect until February of
2010 or later. The new legislation came in the wake
of last year’s Federal Reserve Board determination
that certain practices in the credit card industry were
“unfair or deceptive” to consumers, and it targets
many of those practices.
In July 2009, the Pew Health Group began a new study
to evaluate how widespread these practices were and
to identify trends since our last review in December of
2008. Our research included an examination of nearly
400 credit cards, including all consumer credit cards
offered online by the largest 12 bank issuers in
America. These banks control more than 90 percent
of outstanding credit card debt nationwide.
We found that median advertised interest rates on
bank credit cards were between 13 and 23 percent
higher compared to rates in December of 2008,
depending on a consumer’s credit profile. Meanwhile,
practices labeled “unfair or deceptive” by the Federal
Reserve remained as widespread as they were before
Congress passed the new credit card law. In fact,
some of these practices had become even more
common. In sum, all surveyed bank cards included
at least one “unfair or deceptive” practice. None
of these cards would have met the requirements
of the Credit CARD Act.
Our recent review includes, for the first time, credit
unions. Although the largest 12 credit unions control
only 1 percent of overall credit card lending, many
consumers will find it helpful to know that these
credit unions offered prices that were generally
lower compared to those of the largest banks.
Also, because credit union penalty charges were
both less frequent and less severe than those
of banks, their cards may be useful benchmarks
as the Federal Reserve creates new “reasonable
and proportional” penalty rules, as required under
the Credit CARD Act.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
This report, based on our latest research of nearly
400 credit cards offered by the largest 12 bank and
largest 12 credit union issuers, shows the following:
One hundred percent of credit cards from
the largest 12 banks used practices deemed
“unfair or deceptive” under Federal Reserve
guidelines. None of these bank issued cards
would meet the requirements of the Credit
CARD Act of 2009.
• 99.7 percent of bank cards allowed the issuer
to raise interest rates on outstanding balances by
changing the account agreement unilaterally—up
from 93 percent in December 2008.
• 90 percent of bank cards had penalty interest
rates that could be triggered by late payments or
overlimit transactions. All but 10 percent of these
cards had penalty repricing terms that would
qualify as “hair trigger” under Federal Reserve
guidelines (triggers of one or two late payments
in 12 months).
• 95 percent of bank cards allowed issuers to apply
payments in a manner that the Federal Reserve
found likely to cause substantial monetary injury to
consumers. The other 5 percent did not disclose
the issuer’s policy.
In addition, a new trend is emerging as bank issuers
move away from fixed rate cards. More cards now
feature partially variable interest rates with fixed
minimum rate requirements. Rates on these cards
will go up when third-party index rates rise but
cannot decrease below a fixed minimum set
by the issuer.
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As the Federal Reserve prepares new rules
for “reasonable and proportional” penalties
under the Act, banks continue to charge
substantial penalty rates and fees.
Starting in August 2010, the Credit CARD Act will
require penalty fees and charges to be “reasonable
and proportional” to the “acts or omissions” of
cardholders, based on rules the Federal Reserve
will establish. Meanwhile, penalty rates and fees
have remained mostly unchanged since Congress
passed the new law:
• 99 percent of bank cards included a late fee
(median $39).
• 80 percent of bank cards included an overlimit
fee (median $39).
• The median bank penalty interest rate was
28.99 percent. Most (90 percent) penalty rate
increases could continue indefinitely even if the
cardholder resumes on-time payments.
Whether current levels of penalty fees and charges
meet the new law’s “reasonable and proportional”
requirement will depend on rules the Federal Reserve
is currently developing. Relevant factors may include
how large the penalty is compared to the monthly
required minimum payment or how long penalty
rate increases may apply once cardholders return
to on-time payment behavior.
Credit unions offered significantly lower
advertised rates compared to bank credit
cards, with penalty fees that were half the
cost of comparable bank fees and fewer
dangers associated with “unfair or
deceptive” practices.
The observed credit unions presented a distinct
alternative to credit card pricing and other practices of
the observed banks. In July 2009, median advertised
interest rates on cards from the 12 largest credit
unions were between 9.90 and 13.75 percent annually,
depending on a consumer’s credit profile—approximately
20 percent lower than comparable bank rates.
Meanwhile, credit union penalties were generally
less severe than those of banks.
• 99 percent of credit union cards included a late
fee (median $20).
• 89 percent of credit union cards included
an overlimit fee (median $20).
• The median credit union penalty interest rate
was 17.90 percent. These penalties were less likely
to last indefinitely (one-third of penalties would
terminate after 3 to 12 months of on-time
payments) compared to those of banks.
Like bank cards, the vast majority of credit union
cards included terms allowing the issuer to change
any rates or terms at any time, or take other actions
that the Credit CARD Act will eventually prohibit.
However, compared to bank cards, credit union
cards more closely complied with guidelines against
“unfair or deceptive” practices that the Federal
Reserve developed last year. For example, nearly
half of the credit union cards included no penalty
rates at all, and more than three-quarters of those
that did have penalty rates would have met the
Federal Reserve’s fairness rules.
KEY POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The Credit CARD Act of 2009 provides many
important consumer protections. While some new
disclosure rules became effective in August 2009,
most substantive protections will not take effect
until February of 2010 or later. Until then, banks may
continue to raise rates on outstanding balances,
use what the Federal Reserve labeled “hair trigger”
penalty rate increases, apply payments in a way
that maximizes interest costs, charge unrestricted
overlimit fees and more.
Some banks have recently announced plans to
discontinue overlimit fees, end mandatory arbitration
programs or make other changes. However, more
needs to be done to achieve the vision of safer and
more transparent products that underpins recent
legal developments. Congress is considering a new
bill to accelerate the implementation date of the
Credit CARD Act of 2009. Our research supports
implementing the Act’s core safeguards against
retroactive interest rate increases and other costly
practices immediately.
Going forward, bank regulators have a crucial role
to play in ensuring the goals of the Act are met.
In particular, the Federal Reserve is responsible for
creating new rules to ensure that all penalty fees
and charges are “reasonable and proportional.”
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Based on our latest research, and the Safe Credit
Card Standards we developed after more than a year
of analysis and dialogue with industry and consumer
groups, we make the following key recommendations:
Congress should act to ensure rapid
implementation of the core protections
against “unfair or deceptive” practices found
in the Credit CARD Act of 2009.
The Federal Reserve should regulate penalty
interest rate increases, as well as fees, in its
rules governing “reasonable and proportional”
penalty charges under the Credit CARD Act.
Regulators should provide consumers a guaranteed
right to “cure” penalty rates, restoring original
non-penalty rates after six months of on-time
payment whether repayment begins immediately
or in later billing cycles.
Regulators should limit penalty interest rate
increases to a maximum of seven percentage
points above the non-penalty rate of interest.
The Federal Reserve should prohibit all credit
card penalties that do not further the Act’s
goals of improving price transparency and
protecting consumers from unfair, misleading
or deceptive practices. Specifically,
B
A
Late fees should be judged in proportion to the
amount that is past due, not the overall account
balance.
Late fees that may apply immediately on the
payment due date should be closely scrutinized
for adherence to factors identified in the Act
(cost, deterrence and cardholder conduct).
Overlimit fees should be prohibited because
they cannot be justified based on the factors
identified in the Act. At a minimum, overlimit
fees should be restrained significantly in terms
of cost and when they may apply.
Bank regulators should scrutinize partially
variable rates, which rise with changes in an
index but cannot fall below a fixed minimum
set by the issuer. Cards with partially variable
rates including minimum rate requirements
should not be eligible for exemptions to certain
notice and interest rate rules under the Act,
which were created for true variable rates.
Much of the data discussed in this report is
summarized in the appendices.
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Notes: Data marked (*) above was not calculated for December 2008. December 2008 data for credit unions is not
available. No credit unions offered overdraft protection. For purchase and cash advance annual percentage rates
(APRs), issuers typically advertise a range of rates depending on a consumer’s credit profile. Data represents all
consumer credit cards offered online by the 12 largest bank and 12 largest credit union issuers, which together
control more than 91 percent of credit card outstandings.
Purchase APR
Cash advance APR
Penalty APR
Late fee
Overlimit fee
Cash advance fee
Balance transfer fee
Overdraft protection fee
December 2008
9.99% to 15.99%
*
27.99%
$39
$39
*
*
*
July 2009
12.24%-17.99%
20.24%-21.24%
28.99%
$39
$39
3%
3%
3%
July 2009
9.90% to 13.75%
10.20% to 13.75%
17.90%
$20
$20
2%
2.5%
None
Bank Issuers Credit Union IssuersMedian Fee or Charge
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Despite recent legal developments that will create
stronger consumer protections in the coming year,
credit cards remain a potentially dangerous part of
most Americans’ financial lives. Though the Federal
Reserve has lowered the federal funds rate to historic
lows to make it easier and less costly for banks to borrow
money, credit cardholders have not experienced a
corresponding benefit. New research from The Pew
Charitable Trusts shows that credit cards continue to
include harmful practices and became more costly
for American families in the first half of 2009.
Last December, the Pew Health Group’s Safe Credit
Cards Project conducted the first-ever comprehensive
study of consumer credit card products from the
largest bank issuers.1 We found that practices labeled
“harmful” and “unfair or deceptive” by the Federal
Reserve were endemic.2 Since then, the Federal
Reserve and other regulators have announced
groundbreaking new rules to protect consumers.3
In May, the president signed a new bill, the Credit
CARD Act of 2009, which placed many of the Federal
Reserve’s proposals into law. The bill also added new
protections, including many safeguards featured in
Pew’s Safe Credit Card Standards.4 The new law will
stop penalty interest rate increases on outstanding
balances except when accounts are seriously
delinquent, prevent rate increases generally during
the account’s first year, limit harmful penalty fees and
introduce a host of other important protections.5
Unfortunately for cardholders, most parts of the new
law will not take effect until February of 2010 or later.6
Meanwhile, Pew began a new study of credit card
products in July 2009. Our goal was to evaluate
whether practices deemed “unfair or deceptive” last
year by the Federal Reserve remained widespread,
and how issuers were responding to the concerns
reflected in recent regulatory and legislative actions.
As before, this analysis included all consumer credit
card products offered online by the largest 12 bank
issuers, which controlled 90 percent of credit card
debt nationwide.7
The following pages present the findings of our
latest review. We show the interest rates, fees and
penalty provisions for credit cards offered by the
largest 12 bank issuers based on application
disclosures gathered in July of 2009. Where possible,
we show how these features have changed since
our December 2008 survey or where new trends may
be emerging. Also, for the first time, we include an
analysis of cards from the largest 12 credit unions.
Throughout the report, we provide comparisons
between bank card and credit union card data.
Although credit unions control only a small portion
of credit card outstandings, comparisons between
credit union and bank product models illustrate
options available to consumers and potential
benchmarks for future regulatory rulemaking efforts.
The report concludes with a set of recommendations
for policymakers and issuers based on our research,
our analysis of the Credit CARD Act and our Safe
Credit CARD Standards.8
In sum, this report presents Pew’s findings about
the state of the credit card market on the eve of
significant new federal regulations designed to
eliminate unfair or deceptive practices and foster
safer and more transparent products. How well these
goals are realized depends on the decisions that
both card issuers and regulators make during the
coming months.
INTRODUCTION
ABOUT THE
SAFE CREDIT CARDS PROJECT
In 2007, The Pew Charitable Trusts launched an
effort, in partnership with the Sandler Foundation,
to address growing concerns about perceived
abuses in the credit card industry. The project
team researched consumer use of credit cards,
conducted economic analyses of card issuer
operations and reviewed hundreds of credit
card products. Our team spent more than a year
in discussions with over 20 credit card providers
and consumer groups. This work led to publication
of our Safe Credit Card Standards, intended to
support industry leaders and policymakers as
they evaluate responses to the urgent needs
of American cardholders. The Safe Credit Card
Standards and other information are available at
www.pewtrusts.org/creditcards.
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Starting in 2010, the Credit CARD Act will prevent
issuers from raising interest rates on outstanding
balances. As of July 2009, almost all surveyed bank
card disclosures (99.72 percent) allowed the issuer
to change any interest rate at any time—up from
93 percent of cards in December 2008. Among credit
unions, the figure was 89 percent.
Our research also showed that advertised interest
rates rose significantly in the first half of 2009.
A significant number of issuers shifted toward a
combination fixed/variable rate mechanism that
allows rates to go up as indexes rise, but prevents
rates from falling below a fixed minimum of the
issuer’s choosing. At the same time, penalty interest
rate increases remained a nearly ubiquitous feature
on bank cards. While the vast majority of bank
credit cards continued to employ what the Federal
Reserve characterized as “hair trigger” penalty
repricing, only one credit union offered cards
meeting that description.
A summary of interest rate data discussed below
is provided in Appendix A.
ADVERTISED INTEREST RATES
Credit card interest rates are rising. In July 2009,
median advertised annual percentage rates (APRs)
for purchases on bank issued cards were between
12.24 and 17.99 percent, compared to a range of
9.99 to 15.99 percent in December 2008 (issuers
advertise a range of rates depending on applicant
credit profiles).9 Compared to December of last year,
lowest advertised bank rates grew by more than 20
percent, while highest advertised rates grew by 13
percent.10 It is difficult to measure the impact of rate
increases on existing balances; however, our previous
report identified that issuers raised rates on nearly
one-quarter of existing accounts, costing consumers
a minimum of $10 billion in a one-year period
between 2007 and 2008.11
In general, the largest credit unions offered lower
rates than did the largest banks. In July 2009, median
advertised purchase rates were between 9.90
and 13.75 percent on surveyed credit union cards,
approximately 20 percent lower than comparable
bank rates.
Similarly, interest rates for bank cash advances
were higher than their counterparts at credit unions.
Median cash advance rates ranged from 20.24
to 21.24 percent for bank cards. For credit unions,
median cash advance rates ranged from 10.20
to 13.75 percent, more than 35 percent lower
than comparable bank rates.
PENALTY INTEREST RATE INCREASES
Credit card agreements often give issuers the
power to impose penalty interest rate increases as
a punishment for paying late, exceeding the credit
limit or other reasons. Our review found that most
issuers continued to include penalty rate terms on
their cards, allowing interest rates on existing
balances to jump as high as 30.24 percent.
Data on Penalty Interest Rate Increases
Penalty rate terms were most common among bank
issuers. In July 2009, all of the largest 12 bank issuers
used penalty rate provisions, affecting 90 percent of
their card offerings. At the same time, 7 of the largest
12 credit union issuers imposed penalty rate terms,
accounting for 52 percent of credit union cards.
CREDIT CARD INTEREST RATE TRENDS
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Bank penalty interest rate increases were more
easily triggered than those of credit unions.
• Among the subset of bank cards that included
penalty rates, 51 percent could trigger penalty
rates for a single missed due date, and most of
the rest (39 percent) could be triggered upon the
second missed payment in a 12-month period.
In addition, 80 percent of bank penalty rates could
be triggered by one or more overlimit transaction.
• Credit union penalty rate trigger periods were
significantly longer compared to those of banks.
One credit union offered cards with penalty rates
that could be triggered upon the second late
payment in 12 months. Otherwise, credit union
penalty interest rate increases could apply only
once accounts became 30 or more days paste due.
None of the credit union cards included penalty
triggers for exceeding the credit limit.
Credit unions generally had lower penalty interest
rates compared to banks.
• As of July 2009, the median bank penalty rate was
28.99 percent, representing a premium of between
11.00 and 16.75 percentage points above median
advertised purchase rates. Overall, the median
bank penalty rate increased by one percentage
point since December 2008. The maximum
observed penalty rate on any surveyed card
was 30.24 percent in July 2009, and the largest
observed penalty premium was 23 percentage
points above the advertised purchase rate.
• The median credit union penalty rate was 17.90
percent. This rate represents a premium of between
4.15 and 8.00 percentage points compared to median
advertised credit union purchase rates.
Once a penalty rate is triggered, most issuers
claimed the right to impose the rate indefinitely,
exposing cardholders to ongoing penalty charges
even after they have re-established a history of
timely payments.
• Nineteen of the 24 surveyed issuers used penalty
rates, but only 4 guaranteed they would restore
original non-penalty rates once cardholders
resumed on-time payment (referred to as “cure”).
• Pentagon Federal Credit Union offered the
shortest cure period (3 consecutive months of
on-time payment), followed by USAA (6 months),
Capital One (12 months) and Wescom (12 months).
• One issuer, Bank of America, promised to reduce
rates partially after six months of on-time payments
(by a minimum of two percentage points).
• The remaining 14 issuers included no definite
cure provisions in their application disclosures.12
Note: Data represents all consumer credit cards offered online by the 12 largest bank and 12 largest credit union
issuers, which together control more than 91 percent of credit card outstandings. Percentage of cards expressed
as portion of all surveyed cards by type of issuer. All observed penalty rates applied to all balances (future and
outstanding).
CREDIT CARDS WITH AUTOMATIC PENALTY INTEREST RATE INCREASES, JULY 2009
FIGURE 1
No penalty rate, 10%
Bank Cards - Penalty Rate Terms Credit Union Cards - Penalty Rate Terms
Penalty rate applies, 90%
No penalty
rate, 48%
Penalty rate
applies, 52%
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ANALYSIS OF PENALTY INTEREST
RATE TRENDS
While the Credit CARD Act will significantly alter
credit card penalty rate practices when it takes effect
next year, our survey shows that most of the largest
issuers continue to fall far short of the new threshold.
Beginning in February, 2010, the Credit CARD Act
will prevent issuers from triggering any kind of
penalty rate increase on existing balances, except
when accounts become 60 days past due. This
requirement surpasses an earlier proposal, issued by
the Federal Reserve under its authority to regulate
“unfair or deceptive acts and practices,” to create a
30-day threshold for penalty interest rate increases.13
Under either guideline, penalty rate increases could
only be justified by delinquent payments and not, for
example, by overlimit transactions.
• As of July 2009, the vast majority of bank penalty
rate triggers failed to meet either threshold from
the Federal Reserve or from the Credit CARD Act.
• Conversely, the vast majority of credit union cards
either did not include penalty rates or met the
Federal Reserve 30-day penalty trigger threshold.
Over half of the credit union cards that included
penalty rates also complied with the 60-day trigger
established in the Credit CARD Act. None of the
credit union cards included a one-time late penalty
trigger, and only one credit union issuer used
penalty triggers that met the Federal Reserve’s
“hair trigger” definition. None of the credit union
cards included penalty triggers for exceeding
the credit limit.
• See Appendix B for a table summarizing the
penalty rate triggers for each surveyed issuer.
The table indicates whether each trigger would
meet the Credit CARD Act’s 60-day requirement
or the Federal Reserve’s 30-day “unfair or
deceptive” threshold.
CURE PROVISIONS ON CREDIT CARDS WITH PENALTY RATES, JULY 2009
Note: Chart represents the portion of all cards that included penalty rates (based on study of all consumer
credit cards offered online by the 12 largest bank and 12 largest credit union issuers, which together control more
than 91 percent of credit card outstandings). All assessments based on issuer-provided application disclosures.
A “guaranteed cure” indicates that the issuer will restore the original non-penalty rate of interest automatically
after receiving a given number of consecutive on-time payments. Percentage of cards expressed as portion of
all surveyed cards.
FIGURE 2
Guaranteed cure:
3 to 6 Months, 2%
No guaranteed
reduction, 64% Partial rate reduction:
6 Months, 25%
Guaranteed cure:
12 Months, 9%
www.pewtrusts.org/creditcards
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With penalties that could instantly double the
rate of interest (or more) and add hundreds or
thousands of dollars per year to a cardholder’s
debt burden, credit cards retained their power
to shock.
• The median bank penalty rate, 28.99 percent,
would add costs of between $110 and $167.50
annually (or up to $14 per month), for every
$1,000 borrowed.
• In comparison, the 17.90 median credit union
penalty rate would add between $41.50 and
$80.00 annually (or up to $7 per month) per
$1,000 borrowed.14
• In recent comments to the Federal Reserve, we
demonstrated how accounts with modest balances
of $3,000 would experience a 65 percent increase
in the monthly minimum payment due based on
existing penalty rate provisions.15
Under current law, a penalty rate increase may be
permanent or temporary, at the issuer’s sole discretion.
Beginning in 2010, the CARD Act will require issuers
to terminate penalty interest rate increases within six
months of the date they are imposed, but only if the
cardholder pays on time during that entire period.
While this requirement will help many consumers,
it will leave some without a remedy. If the cardholder
does not pay on time starting immediately when the
penalty is triggered, or misses a payment during that
period, the law’s cure period will not apply regardless
of the cardholder’s subsequent payment behavior.
Only two issuers (covering 2 percent of cards with
penalty rates) offered cure periods that appeared
to meet the new law’s cure requirement. In each
of these cases, however, the cure would exceed
the law’s mandate by applying even if the required
period of on-time payments does not begin
immediately after the penalty is imposed.
PARTIALLY VARIABLE RATES
WITH MINIMUM RATE REQUIREMENTS
Since December 2008, a new trend has emerged as
issuers discontinue “fixed” interest rate offers and
move toward partially variable rates that cannot fall
below a fixed minimum.
Data on Partially Variable Interest Rates
Nearly two-thirds (64 percent) of credit union
cards featured “fixed” purchase rates in July 2009.
Among banks, however, there was a strong trend
against fixed rate pricing. Less than 1 percent of bank
cards included fixed rates, down from 31 percent
in December 2008.
As issuers move away from “fixed” rates, Pew’s
research shows, there is a related and possibly
troublesome trend emerging. A growing number
of credit cards include terms designed to ensure
that even variable rates will not fall lower than a
fixed minimum. For these cards, issuers will benefit
as interest rates rise according to operation of an
index rate, but many cardholders will be prevented
from enjoying the benefits of falling index rates
due to the fixed floor limits set by issuers. We call
this mechanism a minimum rate requirement.
The example in Figure 3, taken from the application
disclosure of a sampled credit card product, illustrates
how the minimum rate requirement works. For this
card, a minimum rate applies regardless of the
disclosed variable interest rate formula.
Use of partially variable rates with fixed minimum
rate requirements is growing rapidly, both in terms
of the number of issuers using the requirement
and the percentage of cards affected. Table 1
summarizes this phenomenon among the largest
12 bank issuers and the largest 12 credit
union issuers.
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EXAMPLE CARD DISCLOSURE FEATURING MINIMUM RATE REQUIREMENT16
FIGURE 3
Note: Percentage of cards expressed as portion of all surveyed cards by type of issuer (bank or credit union).
Data represents all consumer credit cards offered online by the 12 largest bank and 12 largest credit union issuers,
which together control more than 91 percent of credit card outstandings. December 2008 data for credit unions
is not available.
PARTIALLY VARIABLE RATES WITH MINIMUM RATE REQUIREMENTS (MRR)
TABLE 1
Banks
Credit Unions
10%
(3 banks)
n/a
38%
(6 banks)
11%
(3 credit unions)
December 2008 July 2009
Portion of Cards with MRR for
Cash Advance Rate
Banks
Credit Unions
1%
(1 bank)
n/a
9%
(5 banks)
9%
(2 credit unions)
December 2008 July 2009
Portion of Cards with MRR for
Purchase Rate
www.pewtrusts.org/creditcards
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ANALYSIS OF PARTIALLY VARIABLE
INTEREST RATE TRENDS
The move away from “fixed” interest rates may be
due to a change in how that term will be defined.
On credit card products, the term “fixed rate” has
meant that rates will not fluctuate according to a
third-party index rate. It has not meant that the rate is
unchangeable.17 Starting in February 2010, the CARD
Act will require that rates advertised as “fixed” must be
unchangeable for a stated period of time. As noted
above, fixed rates were almost entirely absent from
our July 2009 review of bank card offerings.
As “fixed” rates have become rare, partially variable
rates with fixed minimums have become more common.
This mechanism affects cardholders by adding a
premium on top of the interest rate that a variable
formula would otherwise provide. In the example
application above, the minimum rate requirement
was 8.65 percent (for cardholders qualifying for the
lowest advertised rate). While the disclosed variable
rate formula would have yielded a rate of 6.15
percent (2.90 margin plus then-current index rate
of 3.25 percent), the issuer’s required minimum
of 8.65 percent represented a premium of 2.5
percentage points.18
A list of all reviewed cards containing partially
variable purchase rates with fixed minimum rate
requirements is provided in Appendix A. Minimum
rate premiums on surveyed cards ranged from (-1.75)
to 5.00 percentage points for purchase rates, and
from 0.00 to 5.00 percentage points for cash advance
rates. A negative premium indicates the variable
rate based on the current index is higher than the
required minimum. Similarly, a zero-point premium
indicates the two rates are equal.
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CREDIT CARD PENALTY FEE TRENDS
In addition to interest, most credit card issuers
also charge a variety of fees that can sometimes add
significantly to the cost of using a card. Almost every
card in our survey included penalty fees for paying
late, and most also included fees for exceeding
the credit limit. Most cards continued to include
penalty fees that would violate the Credit CARD
Act’s requirements, and in general, fee structures
have changed little since December 2008.
Overall, penalty fees were slightly more common
among credit union cards than among bank cards,
but credit unions charged significantly lower fee
amounts ($20 compared to $39 for most bank cards).
A summary of fee data discussed in this report
is provided in Appendix C.
LATE FEES
All 24 bank and credit union issuers and 99 percent
of the cards they offered charged a penalty on
cardholders who missed a payment due date.
For bank cards, the median fee applicable to
most accounts was $39. For credit unions, the
median fee was $20.
Late fees on some cards are flat fixed fees, while
on other cards they are tiered based on the
outstanding account balance (for example, a late
fee may be $29 for account balances up to $499.99
and $39 for balances $500 and up). All credit union
late fees were fixed, while the late fee was tiered
based on account balance on 95 percent of bank
cards.19 For these bank cards with tiered late fees,
the amount of fee is demonstrated in Table 2.
Most cards included three tiers of fees, with the
lowest fee ($15) applying only to accounts with
balances of $100 or less and the highest fee ($39)
charged on accounts with balances exceeding $250.
With these thresholds, the vast majority of bank card
customers are subject to the maximum tiered late
fee of $39 since the average outstanding balance
per active credit card account is $2,901.20
TABLE 2
Low tier
Middle tier
High tier
$0 to $100
$100 to $250
$250 or above
$15
$29
$39
$15 to $25
$15 to $29
$35 to $39
Median Balance Threshold Median Late Fee Range of Late Fee
Note: Late fees on cards with tiered arrangements are based on the outstanding account balance. In the table above,
the minimum late fee ($15 median) applies to accounts with balances up to $100 and the highest late fee ($39 median)
applies to accounts with balances exceeding $250. The average outstanding balance per active credit card account
is $2901 (Nilson Report, April 2009). Ninety-five percent of bank cards had tiered late fees, and 5 percent were fixed
(median $39). All credit union late fees were fixed (median of $20).
CREDIT CARD LATE FEES, BANKS (TIERED ACCOUNTS), JULY 2009
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OVERL IMIT FEES
Ten of 12 bank issuers and 10 of 12 credit union issuers
charged a penalty fee for cardholders who exceeded
their credit limits, but 4 of the 24 surveyed issuers
did not use overlimit fees at all. These issuers were
Pennsylvania State Employees’ Credit Union, Schools
First Federal Credit Union, Target and USAA. Overall,
fees for exceeding the credit limit applied to 81 percent
of cards in the sample (80 percent of the bank cards
and 89 percent of the credit union cards).
As with late fees, all credit union overlimit fees were
fixed. Among banks, approximately two-thirds of
credit card overlimit fees were fixed, with the remainder
tiered based on account balance or credit limit, as
shown in Table 2.21 Overall, the median overlimit fee
applicable to most bank issued accounts was $39.
For credit unions, the median fee was $20.
ANALYSIS OF CREDIT CARD
PENALTY FEE TRENDS
The Credit CARD Act of 2009 includes several
new rules on penalty fees, including limiting the
circumstances in which issuers can charge late fees.
The Act will also prohibit overlimit fees unless the
cardholder proactively chooses to opt in to an
overlimit program. As of July 2009, none of the cards
with overlimit fees had instituted “opt in.” In fact,
none of the surveyed cards contained any provision
to allow the cardholder to opt out of an overlimit fee.
In addition, the new law will prohibit charging more
than one overlimit fee per billing cycle. While it was
unclear in the majority of instances whether surveyed
cards met this requirement, some card disclosures
specifically stated that the overlimit fee would be
charged per occurrence.
Most significantly, the Act requires the Federal
Reserve to issue rules ensuring that any penalty
fee or charge, including a late or overlimit fee, is
“reasonable and proportional” to the cardholder
actions that trigger the penalty. This requirement
is not scheduled to take effect until August 2010.
CREDIT CARD OVERLIMIT FEES, BANKS (TIERED ACCOUNTS), JULY 2009
TABLE 3
Low tier
Middle tier
High tier
$0 to $500
$500 to $1,000
$1,000 or above
$15
$25
$39
$15 to $19
$15 to $29
$35 to $39
Median Balance Threshold Median Late Fee Range of Late Fee
Note: Overlimit fees on cards with tiered arrangements are based on the outstanding account balance. In the table
above, the minimum late fee ($15 median) applies to accounts with balances up to $500 and the highest late fee
($39 median) applies to accounts with balances exceeding $1,000. The average outstanding balance per active credit
card account is $2901 (Nilson Report, April 2009). Two-thirds of bank cards had fixed overlimit fees (median $39).
Among credit unions, all overlimit fees were fixed (median $20).
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APPL ICATION OF PAYMENTS
Currently, credit card issuers may choose to apply
monthly payments in a way that maximizes interest
charges. Many accounts have multiple types of
balances, for purchases, balance transfers, cash
advances and so on. Each balance can have its
own interest rate that is higher or lower than other
balances on the account. The Federal Reserve
identified that when an issuer applies a cardholder’s
monthly payment first to balances with low interest
rates before paying down high-rate balances,
cardholders can suffer “substantial monetary injury”
or lose the benefit of “low rate” promotional offers.
Consequently, bank regulators called this practice
“unfair or deceptive” in their 2008 rulemaking.22
In our December 2008 survey, we found that 100
percent of cards applied payments first to low-rate
balances. Our July 2009 survey of cards found that
95 percent of bank issued cards continued the
practice. The remaining 5 percent of cards
expressed no application of payments policies.
Most credit union issuers were silent on their
application of payments policies. Eight of the
12 credit union issuers surveyed expressed identical
rates for all transaction types, meaning application
of payments is not a relevant concern for those cards.
Only one credit union issuer, Wescom, specifically
stated a payment application policy; in this case,
payments applied first to promotional balances then
regular cash advance and purchase rate balances.
The Credit CARD Act requires amounts in excess
of the minimum required payment be paid first to
balances with the highest rates. Although this new
rule will benefit many cardholders and help make
advertised prices more reflective of the true cost
of credit, issuers will remain free to apply a part of
each payment first to low-rate balances. None of
the 24 bank or credit union issuers surveyed explicitly
complied with the new law, but one may infer
compliance from the eight credit unions that
offered a single rate for all transaction types.
TRANSACTION SURCHARGE FEES
Transaction surcharges such as cash advance and
balance transfer fees were common among the cards
we reviewed. These fees are expressed as a percentage
of each transaction, but typically a minimum fee applies
(for example, the fee may be 3 percent of each
balance transfer, with a minimum fee of $10). Less
often, issuers will set a maximum fee cap as well.
Transaction surcharge fees are not “unfair or deceptive”
practices under the Federal Reserve’s recent rulemaking.
Nor did the Credit CARD Act restrict their use.23 As
issuers adapt to the new regulatory environment, it
is possible they will rely more heavily on unregulated
fee income, including transaction surcharges. In fact,
we found that one major issuer has already increased
cash advance fees to 5 percent of each transaction.
These surcharges may add significantly to the cost
of “low rate” balance transfer offers, cash advances
or other transactions. In this section, we provide
information about how transaction surcharge fees
are used in the market today.
Fee data discussed below is summarized in
Appendix C.
Cash Advance Fees
All of the largest 12 bank issuers charged cash
advance fees, affecting 99 percent of bank cards.
The median cash advance fee was 3 percent of the
transaction amount with a range of 3 to 5 percent.
By comparison, only half of the largest 12 credit
unions disclosed cash advance fees, on 59 percent
of their cards. The median credit union cash advance
fee was 2 percent, with a range of 1.5 to 2.5 percent.
Almost all bank cards that had cash advance fees
(99 percent) had a per-transaction required minimum
fee, with a median of $10. Among credit unions,
this figure was 58 percent, with a median required
minimum fee of $2.
OTHER CREDIT CARD TRENDS
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While 65 percent of credit union cash advance fees
were capped (median $50 cap, with a range from
$10 to $50), only 12 percent of bank cash advance
fees included caps (median $75, with a range from
$50 to $75).
Between December 2008 and July 2009, cash
advance fees on bank cards generally remained
constant. However, there is some evidence that
higher fees are coming. The most notable change
was at Bank of America, which, with more than 100
cards offered, had the most cards of any issuer in
our review. As illustrated in Figure 4, half of Bank of
America cards moved from a 3-percent cash advance
fee in December 2008, to a 5-percent cash advance
fee in July of 2009. This cash advance fee was the
largest observed across all surveyed issuers.
BANK OF AMERICA CASH ADVANCE FEES
Percent of all cards offered, December 2008 vs. July 2009
FIGURE 4
Bank of America Cash Advance Fees
December 2008
Bank of America Cash Advance Fees
July 2009
Note: Data represents all consumer credit cards offered at the Bank of America website during the periods shown.
Cards with 4%
cash advance fee:
1% of cards Cards with 3%
cash advance fee:
99% of cards
Cards with 4%
cash advance fee:
4% of cards
Cards with 3%
cash advance fee:
46% of cardsCards with 5%
cash advance fee:
50% of cards
BALANCE TRANSFER FEE
Balance transfer fees were present on 88 percent
of bank cards and 25 percent of credit union cards
surveyed. The median balance transfer fee for
bank cards was 3 percent with a range of 3 to 4
percent. For credit union cards, the median balance
transfer fee was 2.5 percent with a range of
2 to 2.5 percent.
Among banks, 94 percent of cards that had balance
transfer fees also included a minimum fee requirement,
of $5 (median). For credit unions, the figure was
100 percent, with a median required minimum
balance transfer fee of $2.50.
While 100 percent of credit union cards charging
a balance transfer fee included a maximum fee
cap (median $50, ranging from $50 to $100), only
13 percent of bank cards did (median $75, ranging
from $75 to $249). Because balance transfer fees
were not calculated in Pew’s December 2008 study,
we are unable to estimate how they may have
changed since then.
OVERDRAFT PROTECTION FEE
On certain credit cards, overdraft protection services
were available. Issuers offered overdraft protection
as a way to help cardholders avoid overdraft fees
on enrolled checking accounts by using credit card
advances to cover any debits that would exceed
the available checking account balance. For each
transaction, the credit card issuer would impose
a surcharge fee to the credit card account, similar
to a cash advance fee.
STILL WAITING: “Unfair or Deceptive” Credit Card Practices Continue
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FEES FOR THE ISSUANCE
OR AVAILABIL ITY OF CREDIT
Sixteen percent of bank cards and 11 percent of
credit union cards charged an annual fee in July
2009. The median annual fee was $50 for bank cards
and $15 for credit union cards. The prevalence of
annual fees increased slightly since last year (Pew’s
December 2008 study found that 11 percent of bank
cards charged an annual fee). However, there was
no change in the median annual fee ($50). The range
of annual fees for bank cards was substantial, from
$19 to $500, while the range for credit union cards
was smaller, $15 to $45.
Annual fees were the most common type of fee
for issuance or availability of credit among observed
cards. A small number of cards included monthly
maintenance charges, such as fees for closed
accounts that continue to have an unpaid balance.
Some cards included provisional annual fees that
would apply only after the first year or only if the
cardholder failed to use the card to complete
a transaction during the year.
The Credit CARD Act will prevent issuers from
financing fees under certain circumstances but
generally will not limit issuers’ ability to charge fees
for issuance or maintenance of accounts. Because
accounts with multiple types of these fees can be
difficult to evaluate in terms of cost and value, our
Safe Credit Card Standards call for all such fees to
be expressed as a single annual fee. Currently, most
large issuers appear to follow that practice though
we did observe some cards with multiple types
of maintenance fees.
While no credit union cards offered overdraft
protection, 42 percent of the surveyed bank cards
did offer it. The median bank credit card overdraft
protection fee was 3 percent of the transaction
amount, with a range of 3 to 4 percent. The median
required minimum overdraft protection fee was
$10 with a range of $5 to $10. About 9 percent
of these cards expressed a maximum overdraft
protection fee cap ranging from $10 to $20. As with
balance transfer fees, overdraft protection was not
a part of Pew’s December 2008 review and so a
trend analysis is not available.
ANALYSIS
Recent legal developments have done little to inhibit
the use of transaction surcharge fees, yet the fees merit
attention because they can add significantly to the
cost of using a credit card. Figure 5, an excerpt from
a cardholder’s monthly statement demonstrates how
a $22 cash advance resulted in a $10 (45 percent)
surcharge fee. Because the surcharge is treated as a
finance charge under applicable bank law, the issuer’s
statement shows that the fee represents an effective
APR of 539 percent.
EXAMPLE CREDIT CARD STATEMENT WITH CASH ADVANCE FEE AND APPLICABLE APR24
FIGURE 5
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MANDATORY ARBITRATION
Many consumer credit card agreements include
mandatory binding arbitration clauses that prevent
cardholders from suing issuers in a court of law.
Instead, any disputes between the cardholder and
issuer would be addressed through a binding arbitration
process administered by a private company or individual.
Based on our July 2009 review of credit card application
disclosures from the 12 largest bank and 12 largest
credit union issuers, nine bank issuers included a
mandatory arbitration provision in these disclosures
(covering 68 percent of bank cards). None of the
surveyed credit unions indicated that mandatory
arbitration would apply.25 It is unclear from card
applications whether the other 14 issuers did or
did not have an arbitration clause as part of their
full cardholder agreements.
The Credit CARD Act did not address arbitration
clauses. However, arbitration can prevent cardholders
from accessing courts to challenge unfair and deceptive
practices or other legal violations, impairing individual
rights and potentially allowing those violations to spread
unchallenged by thorough legal or public scrutiny. Pew’s
Safe Credit Card Standards call for the elimination
of pre-dispute, binding arbitration agreements.
In August 2009, Bank of America announced it will
no longer enforce mandatory arbitration in disputes
with customers and two other issuers, American
Express and JPMorgan Chase and Co., announced
that they are evaluating the practice as well.26 These
announcements came after the National Arbitration
Forum settled a lawsuit with the Minnesota Attorney
General and agreed to “voluntarily cease to administer
consumer arbitration disputes” as of July 24, 2009.27
Similarly, the American Arbitration Association
recently announced that it will no longer handle
consumer debt-collection cases.28
STILL WAITING: “Unfair or Deceptive” Credit Card Practices Continue
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Two recent federal legal initiatives have established
strong new rules aimed at making credit cards safer
for American consumers. The Federal Reserve’s
recent rules against “unfair or deceptive” acts and
practices laid the foundation for reform while the
Credit CARD Act of 2009 produced a number of
strong new policies that will protect millions of
American cardholders.
Issuers have a responsibility to further the goals
of the Credit CARD Act by providing transparent
pricing structures that promote responsible use of
credit cards. Some issuers have made tentative steps
in that direction. For example, American Express
and Discover recently announced plans to phase
out overlimit fees (four other issuers in our study do
not charge the fee currently); and other issuers have
withdrawn from practices such as mandatory binding
arbitration.29 Though commendable, these steps
have not yet led to the elimination of unfair or
deceptive practices. We encourage issuers to
comply with the Credit CARD Act immediately,
and to adopt the practices found in our Safe
Credit Card Standards and discussed below.30
Likewise, policymakers have much work left to do.
Congress is considering a new proposed bill, H.R.
3639, to accelerate the implementation date of
the Credit CARD Act of 2009. Our research supports
implementing the Act’s core safeguards against
“hair trigger” penalty rate increases and other
costly practices immediately.31
Going forward, banking regulators have a responsibility
under the Act to issue a variety of new rules. In particular,
the Federal Reserve must establish guidelines for
“reasonable and proportional” penalty fees or charges
currently due to be implemented in August 2010.
The Pew Charitable Trusts has provided extended
comments to the Federal Reserve Board on these
provisions, and our recommendations are discussed
below.32 Additional information, including copies
of our comment letters to regulators and the Safe
Credit Card Standards we developed after more
than a year of analysis and dialogue with industry
and consumer groups, is available at
www.pewtrusts.org/creditcards.
Congress should act to ensure rapid
implementation of the core protections
found in the Credit CARD Act of 2009.
Our research shows that practices the Federal Reserve
deemed “unfair or deceptive” and “harmful” in 2008
have remained widespread in 2009. Issuers have
continued to design their credit cards to give them
the power to raise rates on outstanding balances,
use what the Federal Reserve labeled “hair trigger”
penalty rate increases, apply payments in a way that
maximizes interest costs, charge unrestrained
overlimit fees and more. Each year, these practices
cost individual cardholders hundreds or thousands
of dollars, and they collectively add billions of dollars
in costs that are not adequately reflected in advertised
credit card rates. Though the Credit CARD Act will
eventually curtail these practices when it becomes
fully effective in 2010, Congress should ensure that
issuers immediately stop using the “unfair or deceptive”
practices that are the focus of the Act’s reforms.
The Federal Reserve should regulate penalty
interest rate increases under its “reasonable
and proportional” rules.
The Credit CARD Act requires the Federal Reserve to
issue rules ensuring that all penalty fees and charges
are “reasonable and proportional” to a cardholder’s
acts or omissions. As punishments for late payments
or overlimit transactions, penalty interest rate increases
qualify as a “penalty fee or charge” under the Act.
Without regulation from the Federal Reserve,
cardholders will be left at risk of drastic and indefinite
penalty charges—even after they resume perfect
on-time payment behavior. The Federal Reserve
is responsible for ensuring that these penalties are
not unreasonable or disproportionate.
The Act will clearly restrict when a penalty rate may
apply (only once accounts are 60 days past due).
It also establishes a minimum safeguard on how
long penalty rate increases may apply (six months,
if cardholders resume on-time payment immediately).
However, it leaves the Federal Reserve to decide
how large a penalty rate premium may be, or how
long it may last for those cardholders who cannot
repay immediately.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
1.
2.
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Regulators should provide consumers
a guaranteed right to “cure” penalty rates,
restoring original non-penalty rates after
six months of on-time payment whether
repayment begins immediately or in later
billing cycles.
The Credit CARD Act provides a conditional right to
cure, guaranteeing a right to return to non-penalty
rates but only for cardholders who make six consecutive
on-time payments beginning immediately when the
penalty is applied.33
This conditional cure is not sufficient to ensure
reasonability and proportionality. As demonstrated
below, many cardholders will experience significant
jumps in the required monthly minimum when penalty
rates are triggered, and some will struggle to adjust
immediately. With just a partial right to cure in place,
penalty rates could apply indefinitely, even permanently,
for anyone who pays on time for six months but does
not begin doing so immediately when the penalty
rate is triggered.
The Federal Reserve should presume that any penalty
rate that may last indefinitely is in violation of the
“reasonable and proportional” penalty requirements
of the Credit CARD Act. Our Safe Credit Card Standards
would require issuers to restore original non-penalty
rates of interest whenever cardholders resume on-time
payment behavior for six consecutive months.
Regulators should limit penalty interest rate
increases to a maximum of seven percentage
points above the applicable non-penalty rate.
Both as a way to control long-term penalty costs and
to ensure against short-term price shocks caused by
severe penalty rate increases, Pew’s Safe Credit Card
Standards include a maximum penalty rate premium
of seven percentage points.34
Our research shows that the median penalty rate is
28.99 percent, or between 11 and 16.75 percentage
points higher than median advertised non-penalty
purchase rates. This penalty premium adds hundreds
or thousands of dollars to per year to the cost of a
credit card. Absent regulatory rules, most issuers
will remain free to set penalty rates as high as they
choose even after the Credit CARD Act takes effect.35
Regulatory review should consider how severely
penalty rate increases affect the amount of the monthly
minimum payment due. In recent comments to the
Federal Reserve, we demonstrated how accounts
with modest balances of $3,000 would experience
a 65-percent increase in the monthly minimum payment
due based on existing penalty rate provisions. By
comparison, our recommended seven-point maximum
penalty increase would add only 28 percent to the
required monthly payment. This threshold would
greatly reduce the risk of insurmountable price shocks
to consumers while allowing issuers to generate millions
of dollars of additional revenue to compensate for
any marginal costs of delinquencies.36
The Federal Reserve should prohibit all
credit card penalties that do not further the
Act’s goals of improving price transparency
and protecting consumers from unfair or
deceptive practices.
The Federal Reserve’s responsibility for ensuring
“reasonable and proportional” penalties under the
Credit CARD Act includes the regulation of late and
overlimit fees. Pew’s June 25, 2009 comments to the
Federal Reserve suggested specific guidelines for
“reasonable and proportional” penalty fees, which
are summarized below.37
Overlimit fees should be prohibited.
We question whether any overlimit fees can be
justified based on the “reasonable and proportional”
factors identified in the Credit CARD Act (cost,
deterrence and cardholder behavior). Because
overlimit transactions are processed automatically,
it is unclear what additional costs the issuer may
be said to incur due to a “violation or omission”
of the cardholder.
Further, because the cardholder often will have
incomplete information about the account’s proximity
to the credit limit, and because the issuer always can
control whether the account exceeds the limit, it is
difficult to see how an overlimit fee furthers such
B A
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goals as deterrence or punitive action. Indeed, better
forms of deterrence and punishment are available, in
the form of denied transactions.
Therefore, the best way to address overlimit fees
is to prohibit them (issuers would remain free to allow
certain transactions that exceed the account’s credit
limit, but could not charge a fee for it). Pew’s Safe
Credit Card Standards call for the elimination of
overlimit fees entirely because they can cause unfair
or confusing results for cardholders, and because
of the complexities involved in safeguarding against
potential abuses.
As noted above, four of the 24 issuers in our study
included no overlimit fees on their credit cards. Other
issuers, including American Express and Discover,
recently announced that they will voluntarily discontinue
the use of overlimit fees (though as of our July 2009
survey both issuers continued to charge overlimit fees
on most advertised cards).38 We encourage other
issuers to simplify their products and improve price
transparency by likewise eliminating overlimit fees.
If overlimit fees remain permissible, regulators
should only accept a nominal overlimit fee
amount, which may apply only once an account
has exceeded the credit limit by a significant
threshold.
In judging whether the size of an overlimit fee is
reasonable and proportional, regulators may look
to a number of examples. As shown in this report,
penalty fees at the largest credit unions are nearly
half the size of those at large banks. Also, some
states have set limits on penalty fees (California
state banks may charge no more than a $10 overlimit
fee, for instance).
Overlimit fees should only be permitted where an
account is significantly overlimit. The threshold for
determining “significant” should be large enough to
avoid problems associated with a cardholder’s lack of
information about the account’s proximity to the credit
limit, holds placed against the account, “rent seeking”
motivations on the part of the issuer, and so on (“rent
seeking” refers to situations in which issuers would have
a perverse incentive to allow or even encourage their
customers to engage in “bad” behavior as a way of
maximizing penalty fee income). For example,
California allows its state banks to charge overlimit
fees only where accounts are the lesser of five hundred
dollars or 120 percent beyond their limit.39
A small number of issuers in our survey included an
overlimit fee threshold, including Suncoast Schools
Federal Credit Union (no overlimit fee unless balance
exceeds limit by 5-percent threshold), Vystar Credit
Union (1-percent threshold) and Wescom Credit Union
(20 percent threshold).40
Late fees should be judged in proportion
to the amount that is past due, not the
overall account balance.
Generally, the size of a late fee should be in
proportion to the amount that is past due (i.e., the
minimum payment due), not the overall account
balance. The median late fee ($39) represents only
1.3 percent of the median household’s credit card
balance but approximately 60 percent of the
applicable required minimum payment. A fee that
increases the minimum payment due by 60 percent
may be difficult to justify as being proportional.
Late fees that may apply immediately on the
payment due date should be closely scrutinized
for adherence to factors identified in the Act
(cost, deterrence and cardholder conduct).
For the fee to be based on deterrence and cardholder
behavior factors, it is appropriate to create a leniency
period of several days after the due date to ensure
that the payment is not late due to factors beyond
the cardholder’s control, such as mail delivery or
payment processing delays. A leniency period
is especially appropriate given that issuers are
unlikely to incur additional costs immediately
on the due date.
Some issuers already provide such a leniency period.
For example, five issuers in our review included in
their application disclosures a leniency period before
late fees would apply: Patelco Credit Union (late fee
applies once account is 10 days past due), Schools
First Federal Credit Union (15 days), Suncoast Schools
Federal Credit Union (“5th day after due date or
closing date whichever comes first”), Vystar Credit
D
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Union (10 days) and Wescom Credit Union (15 days).
In our conversations with other issuers, some indicated
to us that they have a policy of allowing a leniency
period before charging penalty fees but do not
disclose it to cardholders.
In general, the Federal Reserve should
narrowly interpret the justification factors
for penalty fees and charges under the
Credit CARD Act, and allow penalties only
when they further the Act’s primary goals
of improving price transparency and
protecting consumers from unfair,
misleading or deceptive practices.41
Section 102(b) of the Act instructs the Federal
Reserve to establish rules for reasonable and
proportional penalties based on three specific
factors: the cost incurred by the creditor for the
associated omission or violation, the deterrence
value of the penalty and the conduct of the
cardholder. The Federal Reserve may also identify
other factors it deems appropriate.
The factors identified in the law (cost, deterrence
and cardholder behavior) establish a very narrow
basis for justifying penalties, including late and
overlimit fees. The Federal Reserve’s rules should
reflect that narrowing approach, particularly in regard
to the cost considerations that may justify a penalty.
For example, the only relevant costs incurred by
the creditor are those that relate to the specific
“omission or violation” that is being penalized.
Generally applicable costs of doing business,
including risk exposure, must not be included;
rather, the only relevant costs are whatever actual
marginal costs the issuer incurs in responding to
the penalized behavior.
Similarly, because the law is designed in favor of
maximizing price transparency and market efficiency,
the Federal Reserve’s rules generally should err on
the side of those goals by constraining the proliferation
of confusing or potentially “rent seeking” fee structures.
For penalties that are not readily justifiable based on
the factors provided in the law, the Federal Reserve
should tolerate no more than nominal fees.
Our June 2009 comments to the Federal Reserve
also included suggestions, not included here, on
setting safe harbor guidelines for “reasonable
and proportional” penalty fees.42
Bank regulators should scrutinize partially
variable rates, which rise with changes in an
index but cannot fall below a fixed minimum
set by the issuer. Cards with partially variable
rates including minimum rate requirements
should not be eligible for exemptions to
certain notice and interest rate rules under the
Act, which were created for true variable rates.
In a comment letter to the Federal Reserve, dated
September 21, 2009, we explained the following
recommendations related to the trend toward
partially variable rates with fixed “minimum rate
requirements” explained above.43
The Federal Reserve should rule that card
accounts with variable rates including fixed
minimum rate requirements are not eligible
for the variable rate exception to the general
ban on retroactive rate increases.
Beginning in February, 2010, Section 101(b) of the
Credit CARD Act of 2009 will generally prohibit
issuers from increasing the annual interest rate on
any outstanding balance. However, the law provides
a limited number of exceptions to this rule. One such
exception allows variable interest rates to fluctuate in
accordance with a credit card agreement that provides
for changes in the rate “according to operation of an
index” that is “not under the control of the creditor.”
This exception should not apply to cards with minimum
rate requirements, and rate increases on outstanding
balances should not be allowed based on index rate
changes for these accounts. Partially variable rates
do not meet the requirements for the exception
under the law for at least three reasons. First, these
accounts do not provide for changes “according to
operation of an index.” Furthermore, by placing a
minimum fixed floor against which the index cannot
operate, the issuer has exercised control over the
index in a way that contradicts the law’s requirements.
Finally, accounts with minimum rate requirements do
not justify an exception allowing rate increases on
A
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outstanding balances because they allow issuers to
expose cardholders to risk of higher rates if the index
rises while limiting cardholders’ ability to benefit if
the index falls.
For similar reasons, the Federal Reserve
should enforce the Credit CARD Act’s
45-day notice and right to cancel rules
on card accounts with minimum rate
requirements.
Section 101(a) of the Credit CARD Act requires
issuers that wish to raise interest rates or make other
significant changes to notify cardholders at least 45
days before doing so and to inform cardholders that
they may reject the proposed changes and cancel
the account. The same exceptions, including the
variable rate exception, that apply to the prohibition
against raising rates on outstanding balances
(Section 101(b) of the Act) apply to these notice
requirements. For the same reasons noted above,
cards including minimum rate requirements should
not be eligible for these exceptions in the case of
notice requirements.
As use of minimum rate requirements increases,
problems of deception or confusion may also arise.
Currently, we have no data on the extent to which
consumers are misled or deceived by the minimum
rate rule. We encourage banking regulators to scrutinize
the practice for compliance with the Credit CARD
Act and to watch for signs that it is undermining the
goals of that Act by hindering pricing transparency
or exposing consumers to unfair, misleading or
deceptive practices.44
Issuers and policymakers should take the
following additional steps to make credit
cards safer and more transparent
In addition to complying with the Credit CARD Act
as quickly as possible, we encourage issuers to adopt
our Safe Credit Card Standards. The Standards suggest
guidelines not yet implemented by policymakers,
including discontinuing the use of overlimit fees,
removing mandatory arbitration clauses from consumer
credit card agreements, imposing no more than a
seven-point penalty interest rate premium and
restoring original non-penalty rates of interest
whenever a delinquent cardholder makes six
consecutive on-time payments.45
Below are additional recommendations for issuers
and policymakers, based on our recent research
and the Safe Credit Card Standards
Transaction surcharge fees should be kept
small enough to avoid becoming significant
hidden costs that can undermine the value
of “low rate” promotional offers.
Because surcharge fees for balance transfers and
other transactions have not been affected by recent
legal developments aimed at protecting consumers,
issuers may rely on them more heavily in the future.
Surcharge fees can equate to high effective rates of
interest, an outcome that cardholders may find
surprising especially in conjunction with “low-rate”
balance transfer offers. We encourage issuers to
keep the transparency and fairness goals of the
Credit CARD Act in mind to ensure that transaction
surcharge fees do not become a significant hidden
cost to cardholders. Policymakers should monitor
these fees to ensure against misleading “low rate”
promotional offers with unreasonably high
transaction costs.
Fees for the issuance or availability of credit
should be consolidated into a single fee for
all accounts.
The Pew Safe Credit Card Standards assert that all
account maintenance fees should be expressed as
a single annual fee. Consolidating fees in this way
clarifies the cost to the cardholder and reduces
incentives issuers may have to embed multiple
service fees that make the overall price of credit difficult
to identify or compare. The Federal Reserve has used
the phrase “fees for the issuance or availability of credit”
to include annual or periodic fees for account activity
or inactivity as well as any non-periodic fees related
to opening an account.46 We have encouraged the
Federal Reserve to strengthen its definition of
this and other types of fees to help promote the
specific goal of the Credit CARD Act to ensure
price transparency and restrain penalty fees to
reasonable levels.47
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Payments should always be applied first
to balances with the highest interest rate.
While the Credit CARD Act added an important
new safeguard by requiring payments to be applied
first to highest-rate balances, it provided a carve-out
exempting minimum payment amounts from the
rule. More could be done to protect consumers,
particularly those who are struggling to get ahead
of their debt in times of high unemployment.
Pew’s Safe Credit Card Standards would require the
entire amount of the payment, including the minimum
amount due, be applied to the balances with the
highest APRs first. Some have defended the minimum
rate carve-out as a way to preserve low-rate promotional
offers, but that argument rests on the assumption
that issuers can only offer low-rate promotions if they
attract customers with “low” rates but manipulate
payments on the back end to maximize interest income.48
We encourage issuers to reject this formula and to
apply all payments first to high-rate balances. Also,
we encourage policymakers to monitor cardholder
experiences after the rule takes effect in 2010,
to determine whether the carve-out can remain
justified based on the value of promotional rates
or other factors.
Mandatory arbitration clauses should not
be part of consumer credit card contracts.
Neither the Credit CARD Act nor the regulations
issued by the Federal Reserve directly address
mandatory binding arbitration. Arbitration clauses
in cardholder agreements limit a cardholder’s legal
rights to settle disputes with the issuer in a court
of law, and instead require the cardholder to submit
to the decision of a privately employed arbitrator.
The Pew Safe Credit Card Standards continue
to call for the elimination of pre-dispute binding
arbitration. We encourage all credit card issuers
to abandon the practice as Bank of America and
others appear to be doing.49
C
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Those who hold credit cards have a responsibility to
use their cards wisely and repay their debts promptly.
But as Americans wait to see the benefits of legal
actions intended to make credit cards safer and more
transparent, responsible cardholders remain at risk
of widespread unfair or deceptive practices. Congress
can help by advancing the effective date of the core
protections against these practices found in the Credit
CARD Act of 2009.
The Federal Reserve and other regulators have much
work to do. We encourage them to use their mandate
to constrain the use of overlimit fees, ensure proportional
late fees based on the amount that is past due and
not the overall account balance, prevent unreasonably
severe penalty charges by limiting the size and duration
of penalty rate increases, and generally maximize
transparency by minimizing hidden or unpredictable
credit card costs.
Issuers, too, have a key role to play. Though the new
laws are designed to restore competition in the American
credit card marketplace based on transparent pricing,
this goal will not be accomplished unless industry
leaders embrace it.
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APPENDIX A: INTEREST RATE DATA
TABLE A-1: MEDIAN ADVERTISED ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATES (APRs) - PURCHASES
All Banks
All Credit
Unions
December-08 July-09
9.99% 12.24% 2.25 points 23%
n/a 9.90%
Purchase APR — OVERALL
Lowest Advertised APR Change
(percentage points /
% change) December-08 July-09
15.99% 17.99% 2.00 points 13%
n/a 13.75%
Highest Advertised APR Change
(percentage points /
% change)
American
Express
Bank of
America
Barclays
Capital One
Chase
Citi
Discover
HSBC (1)
Target
U.S. Bank
USAA
Wells Fargo
December-08 July-09
13.99% 13.24% (-0.75) points -5%
9.99% 11.99% 2.00 points 20%
n/a 13.74%
14.90% 17.80% 2.90 points 19%
9.99% 10.24% 0.25 points 3%
12.49% 13.24% 0.75 points 6%
9.99% 12.99% 3.00 points 30%
8.99% 9.74% 0.75 points 8%
11.99% 13.99% 2.00 points 17%
11.99% 11.99% 0.00 points 0%
5.75% 7.75% 2.00 points 35%
10.82% 10.65% (-0.17) points -2%
Purchase APR — BANKS (TOP 12)
Lowest Advertised APR Change
(percentage points /
% change) December-08 July-09
13.99% 13.24% (-0.75) points -5%
14.99% 18.24% 3.25 points 22%
n/a 17.24%
14.90% 17.80% 2.90 points 19%
18.99% 18.24% (-0.75) points -4%
13.99% 16.24% 2.25 points 16%
17.99% 18.99% 1.00 points 6%
17.99% 14.74% (-3.25) points -18%
20.99% 22.99% 2.00 points 10%
13.99% 16.24% 2.25 points 16%
16.90% 18.90% 2.00 points 12%
21.40% 22.65% 1.25 points 6%
Highest Advertised APR Change
(percentage points /
% change)
Continued...
TABLE A-1: MEDIAN ADVERTISED ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATES (APRs) - PURCHASES
...continued
America First
CU (2)
Boeing
Employees CU
Digital FCU
Golden 1 CU
Navy FCU
Patelco CU
PA State
Employees CU
Pentagon FCU
Schools First
FCU
Suncoast
Schools FCU
Vystar CU
Wescom CU
July-09
10.50%
6.90%
8.50%
10.90%
9.40%
12.90%
9.90%
13.99%
8.90%
12.90%
10.90%
11.15%
Purchase APR — Credit Unions (TOP 12)
Lowest Advertised APR
July-09
n/a
18.00%
13.75%
13.00%
18.00%
12.90%
9.90%
13.99%
17.90%
12.90%
10.90%
13.15%
Highest Advertised APR
Median amounts for lowest advertised rates and highest advertised rates are provided. Issuers typically advertise a
range of rates that may apply depending on an applicant’s credit profile. December 2008 figures are not available for
credit unions, nor for Barclays (a new entrant to the top 12 issuer category since December due to Chase’s acquisition
of Washington Mutual). In the table above, “FCU” indicates Federal Credit Union.
(1) Because of limited availability of application disclosures on the HSBC website only one card is included in the
survey. Other HSBC disclosures were not available until after personal identification such as social security numbers
were provided.
(2) America First disclosures include a lowest possible rate but do not say how high rates may go; therefore, we have
not included high advertised rates for this issuer.
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TABLE A-2: MEDIAN ADVERTISED ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATES (APR) - CASH ADVANCE
AND PENALTY RATES (JULY 2009)
All Banks
All Credit
Unions
Low High
20.24% 21.24%
10.20% 13.75%
Cash Advance APR
28.99%
17.90%
Penalty APR
American
Express
Bank of
America
Barclays
Capital
One
Chase
Citi
Discover
HSBC (1)
Target
U.S. Bank
USAA
Wells
Fargo
Low High
21.24% 21.24%
19.24% 19.24%
20.24% 20.24%
24.90% 24.90%
19.24% 23.24%
21.99% 21.99%
23.99% 23.99%
19.24% 19.24%
25.99% 25.99%
20.99% 20.99%
7.75% 18.90%
23.49% 23.49%
Cash Advance APR
18.24% to 27.24%
27.24%
30.24%
29.40%
29.99%
29.99%
29.99%
27.24%
29.99%
28.99%
11.00% to 22.15%
27.24%
Penalty APR
Low High
9.50% 10.50%
6.90% 18.00%
8.50% 13.75%
10.90% 13.00%
11.40% 18.00%
n/a n/a
9.90% 9.90%
n/a n/a
8.90% 17.90%
12.90% 12.90%
10.90% 10.90%
11.15% 13.15%
Cash Advance APR
n/a
27.90%
17.50%
17.50%
17.90%
n/a
n/a
17.99%
17.90%
n/a
n/a
18.00%
Penalty APR
America First
CU (2)
Boeing
Employees CU
Digital FCU
Golden 1 CU
Navy FCU
Patelco CU
PA State
Employees CU
Pentagon FCU
Schools First
FCU
Suncoast
Schools FCU
Vystar CU
Wescom CU
Median amounts for lowest advertised rates and highest advertised rates are provided. Issuers typically advertise a range of rates
that may apply depending on an applicant's credit profile. Some credit unions do not disclose penalty interest rates or separate
cash advance rates. In the table above, “FCU” indicates Federal Credit Union.
(1) Because of limited availability of application disclosures on the HSBC website, only one card is included in the survey. Other
HSBC disclosures were not available until after personal identification such as social security numbers were provided.
(2) America First disclosures include a lowest possible rate but do not say how high rates may go; therefore,
we have not included high advertised rates for this issuer.Disclosures do not specify a separate cash advance APR,
but AmericaFirst charges a 1.5 percent cash advance fee so we have assumed the same rates for cash advances
as for purchases.
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Overall
Banks
(Top 12)
Credit Unions
(Top 12)
TABLE A-3: CARDS INCLUDING PARTIALLY VARIABLE RATES WITH FIXED MINIMUM RATE
REQUIREMENTS (MRR) FOR PURCHASES
Issuer Card
Barclays Clark Platinum MasterCard
Barclays EmigrantDirect Platinum MasterCard
Barclays EmigrantDirect World MasterCard
Barclays Performance Bicycle Rewards MasterCard
Target Visa Credit Card
USAA American Express Cash Rewards
USAA American Express Total Rewards
USAA MasterCard Cash Rewards
USAA MasterCard Total Rewards
Wells Fargo Cash Back Card
Wells Fargo Cash Back College Visa Card
Wells Fargo College Visa Card
Wells Fargo Home Rebate Card
Wells Fargo Rewards Card
Wells Fargo Visa Platinum Card
Digital Federal CU Visa Classic Card
Digital Federal CU Visa Gold Card
Digital Federal CU Visa Platinum Card
U.S. Bank College Rewards Visa
U.S. Bank Young Adult Visa
U.S. Bank Bed Bath & Beyond MasterCard
U.S. Bank Cache Specialty Rewards Visa Platinum Card
U.S. Bank Sierra Trading Post Rewards Visa Platinum
U.S. Bank SKYPASS Visa No Annual Fee
U.S. Bank SKYPASS Visa Signature
U.S. Bank Cash Rewards Visa Platinum
U.S. Bank Select Rewards Visa Platinum
U.S. Bank Travel Rewards Visa Platinum
U.S. Bank Visa Platinum
U.S. Bank Visa Signature
U.S. Bank Harley-Davidson High Performance Visa
U.S. Bank Gymboree Visa Platinum Card
US Bank DISTANCIA Visa Card
US Bank DISTANCIA Visa Signature Card
Navy Federal CU Navy FCU CashRewards Visa
Advertised
Margin
Margin + 3.25
Index Rate
MRR MRR
Premium
7.99% 11.24% 16.24% 5.00%
5.99% 9.24% 14.24% 5.00%
5.99% 9.24% 14.24% 5.00%
5.99% 9.24% 14.24% 5.00%
7.99% 11.24% 13.99% 2.75%
1.75% 5.00% 7.75% 2.75%
1.75% 5.00% 7.75% 2.75%
1.75% 5.00% 7.75% 2.75%
1.75% 5.00% 7.75% 2.75%
4.90% 8.15% 10.65% 2.50%
9.90% 13.15% 15.65% 2.50%
5.90% 9.15% 11.65% 2.50%
4.90% 8.15% 10.65% 2.50%
4.90% 8.15% 10.65% 2.50%
2.90% 6.15% 8.65% 2.50%
3.00% 6.25% 8.50% 2.25%
3.00% 6.25% 8.50% 2.25%
3.00% 6.25% 8.50% 2.25%
7.99% 11.24% 11.99% 0.75%
7.99% 11.24% 11.99% 0.75%
10.99% 14.24% 14.99% 0.75%
7.99% 11.24% 11.99% 0.75%
7.99% 11.24% 11.99% 0.75%
12.99% 16.24% 16.99% 0.75%
12.99% 16.24% 16.99% 0.75%
5.99% 9.24% 9.99% 0.75%
5.99% 9.24% 9.99% 0.75%
5.99% 9.24% 9.99% 0.75%
5.99% 9.24% 9.99% 0.75%
5.99% 9.24% 9.99% 0.75%
9.99% 13.24% 13.99% 0.75%
11.99% 15.24% 15.99% 0.75%
11.99% 15.24% 15.99% 0.75%
11.99% 15.24% 15.99% 0.75%
6.40% 9.65% 7.90% -1.75%
Lowest Advertised Rates
Advertised
Margin
Margin + 3.25
Index Rate
MRR MRR
Premium
11.99% 15.24% 20.24% 5.00%
12.99% 16.24% 21.24% 5.00%
12.99% 16.24% 21.24% 5.00%
13.99% 17.24% 22.24% 5.00%
16.99% 20.24% 22.99% 2.75%
12.90% 16.15% 18.90% 2.75%
12.90% 16.15% 18.90% 2.75%
12.90% 16.15% 18.90% 2.75%
12.90% 16.15% 18.90% 2.75%
16.90% 20.15% 22.65% 2.50%
16.90% 20.15% 22.65% 2.50%
15.90% 19.15% 21.65% 2.50%
16.90% 20.15% 22.65% 2.50%
16.90% 20.15% 22.65% 2.50%
16.90% 20.15% 22.65% 2.50%
10.50% 13.75% 8.50% -5.25%
10.50% 13.75% 8.50% -5.25%
10.05% 13.30% 8.50% -4.80%
16.99% 20.24% 20.99% 0.75%
16.99% 20.24% 20.99% 0.75%
10.99% 14.24% 14.99% 0.75%
16.99% 20.24% 20.99% 0.75%
16.99% 20.24% 20.99% 0.75%
12.99% 16.24% 16.99% 0.75%
12.99% 16.24% 16.99% 0.75%
18.99% 22.24% 22.99% 0.75%
18.99% 22.24% 22.99% 0.75%
18.99% 22.24% 22.99% 0.75%
18.99% 22.24% 22.99% 0.75%
5.99% 9.24% 9.99% 0.75%
9.99% 13.24% 13.99% 0.75%
11.99% 15.24% 15.99% 0.75%
11.99% 15.24% 15.99% 0.75%
11.99% 15.24% 15.99% 0.75%
13.40% 16.65% 18.00% 1.35%
Highest Advertised Rates
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THE MRR IS A FIXED MINIMUM RATE SET BY THE ISSUER. THE MRR PREMIUM IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
THE RATE OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY THE VARIABLE RATE FORMULA AND THE REQUIRED MINIMUM RATE.
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America First CU
Patelco CU
PA State ECU
Suncoast Schools FCU
Vystar CU
Golden 1 CU
Digital FCU
Schools First CU
Wescom CU
Pentagon FCU
USAA
Boeing ECU (1)
Wells Fargo (2)
Capital One (3)
US Bank
Navy FCU
Bank of America (4)
American Express (5)
None (no penalty rates)
None (no penalty rates)
None (no penalty rates)
None (no penalty rates)
None (no penalty rates)
60 days past due twice in 12 months,
or 90 days past due
30 days past due twice in 6 months
30 days past due twice in 12 months
30 days past due twice in 12 months
No payment by “second due date”
Account is “two payments past due”
• 30 days past due; or
• “Your Account is considered
in default for any reason”
• No payment for “two consecutive
billing periods;” or
• Over limit two consecutive months
Three days late twice in 12 months
• 15 days past due;
• Five days late twice in 12 months
(some cards); or
• Over limit twice in 12 months
Twice late in 12 months
Twice either late or over limit
in 12 months
• Once or twice late in 12 months; or
• Over limit three times in 12 months













See note


See note














See note


See note

Penalty Trigger
CARD Act of 2009
60-day trigger
Effective 2/22/2010
Federal Reserve Rules
against “unfair or deceptive acts”
30-day trigger
Not active - superseded by CARD Act
APPENDIX B: PENALTY INTEREST RATE TRIGGERS
TABLE B-1: ISSUER PENALTY RATE TRIGGERS
COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL GUIDELINES ON PENALTY INTEREST RATE TRIGGERS – JULY 2009
The following table summarizes credit card penalty triggers (the events that can cause penalty interest rate increases to
apply) for the largest 12 bank and largest 12 credit union issuers based on a review of application disclosures in July of
2009. The table indicates whether the issuer’s current penalty trigger would comply with federal consumer safety guidelines
scheduled to take effect in 2010.
Continued...
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Notes: The Credit CARD Act of 2009 (Pub. L.111-24)
will ban all penalty rate increases on existing balances
except where the account is 60 days past due, while the
Federal Reserve would have used a 30-day threshold
(74 FR 18 5498 et. seq., originally scheduled for
implementation in July 2010 but superseded by Credit
CARD Act). Neither guideline has taken effect yet, so
current non-compliance does not indicate a violation
of law or regulation. Data represents all consumer
credit cards offered online by the 12 largest bank and
12 largest credit union issuers, which control more than
91 percent of credit card outstandings All assessments
based solely on issuer-provided application disclosures.
In the table above, “FCU” indicates Federal Credit
Union and “ECU” indicates Employees’ Credit Union.
Unless otherwise noted in the table above or in the
notes below, our survey found that all cards from a
given issuer have identical penalty interest rate terms.
Not all triggers are shown; for example, some penalty
rates could also be triggered if a payment is not
honored by the cardholder’s bank. We interpreted the
terms “second due date,” “two payments past due,”
and “two consecutive billing periods” to indicate that
penalty rates could apply to accounts that are more
than 30 but fewer than 60 days past due.
(1) Though Boeing Employees’ Credit Union included
a 30-day trigger, we did not consider their cards as
meeting the Federal Reserve threshold because
the penalty rate could also apply if the account “is
considered in default for any reason.”
(2) Wells Fargo cards would have met the Federal
Reserve threshold but for the overlimit trigger.
(3) All Capital One cards included penalty interest
rates, with one exception. The MTV Visa card for
those with limited credit included no penalty rate
and would therefore meet the thresholds set by
the Credit CARD Act and the Federal Reserve.
(4) Nearly three-quarters of all Bank of America Cards
included penalty interest rates with a trigger of
either two times late or overlimit (overlimit was not
a trigger for Visa Signature and World MasterCard
accounts, which do not have set credit limits), and
these cards would not meet the Credit CARD Act
nor the Federal Reserve penalty trigger thresholds.
Approximately one-quarter of Bank of America
cards, a group of cards marketed for students,
included no penalty rates and would therefore
meet these thresholds.
(5) All American Express cards included penalty
interest rates. The majority included a two-tiered
trigger, where a “default” rate applies after one
late payment and a “serious default” rate applies
after the second late payment in 12 months; the
remainder included a trigger of 2 late payments
in 12 months.
(6) One Chase card, the Disney Rewards Visa card,
included a trigger other than what is shown above
(trigger is two times late in six months).
(7) Because of limited availability of application
disclosures on the HSBC website, only one card
is included in the survey. Other HSBC disclosures
were not available until after personal identification
such as social security numbers were provided.
TABLE B-1: ISSUER PENALTY RATE TRIGGERS ...continued
Target
Discover
Chase (6)
Citi
Barclays
HSBC (7)
One time late
• One time late; or
• Twice over limit in 12 months
(most cards)
• One time late; or
• One time overlimit (most cards)
• One time late;
• One time over limit (most cards); or
• “If you default under any card
agreement you have with us”
One time late or over limit
One time late or over limit












Penalty Trigger
CARD Act of 2009
60-day trigger
Effective 2/22/2010
Federal Reserve Rules
against “unfair or deceptive acts”
30-day trigger
Not active - superseded by CARD Act
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APPENDIX C: FEE DATA
TABLE C-1: MEDIAN PENALTY FEES - JULY 2009
Banks
Credit
Unions
Cards w/Fee Amount
99% $39
100% $20
Late Fee (1)
Cards w/Fee Amount
80% $39
89% $20
Overlimit Fee (2)
(1) All credit union late fees were fixed. For bank issued cards, 5 percent of late fees were fixed with a median fee
of $39, and the remainder were tiered with a median fee of $39 applying to accounts with balances $250 and up.
(2) All credit union overlimit fees were fixed. For bank issued cards, 63 percent of overlimit fees were fixed
with a median fee of $39, and the remainder were tiered with a median fee of $39 applying to accounts with
balances $1,000 and up.
(3) The average outstanding balance per active account is $2,901according to the August 2009 Nilson Report.
Therefore, the maximum tiered rates would usually apply.
TABLE C-2: MEDIAN TRANSACTION SURCHARGE FEES - JULY 2009
Banks
Credit
Unions
Cards
w/Fee
Fee Amount
(%Txn)
Minimum
(% cards)
Fee Cap
(% cards)
99% 3% $10
(98%)
$75
(12%)
59% 2% $2
(58%)
$50
(65%)
Cash Advance Fee (1)
Notes: Minimums and fee caps are expressed as a percentage of all cards that include the fee.
(1) Transaction surcharge fees are stated as a percentage of the transaction. Most cards require a minimum fee
regardless of transaction size. Some cards also include a maximum fee amount, or "fee cap.” The table above
indicates these minimums and caps and the percentage of applicable cards that include them.
(2) These figures represent cards expressing a standard balance transfer fee and their respective minimums
and maximums. We have not included data on promotional balance transfer fees.
Cards
w/Fee
Fee Amount
(%Txn)
Minimum
(% cards)
Fee Cap
(% cards)
88% 3% $5
(94%)
$75
(13%)
25% 2.5% $2.50
(100%)
$50
(100%)
Balance Transfer Fee (1)
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Through ongoing research documenting practices
across a broad range of products offered by the
credit card industry, we seek to provide information
and recommendations to support the development
of sound policy, regulatory and business decisions.
Data in this report is based on an analysis of
application disclosures provided by credit card
issuers at the time a consumer applies for a credit
card. Between July 8 and July 10 of 2009, Pew’s
research staff gathered these disclosures for all
consumer credit card products offered online by
the country’s 12 largest bank issuers and 12 largest
credit union issuers, identified in Table D-1 below.
The largest 12 bank issuers hold $780.8 billion, or 90.4
percent of the overall credit card debt of $864 billion
and include the top 10 Visa and MasterCard issuers,
plus American Express and Discover. The largest
12 credit unions hold $9.4 billion or 1.1 percent
of overall credit card debt and include the top 12
Visa and MasterCard issuing credit unions.50
APPENDIX D: METHODOLOGY
TABLE D-1: CREDIT CARD ISSUERS INCLUDED IN THE STUDY
American Express
Bank of America
Barclays
Capital One
JPMorgan Chase
Citigroup
Discover
HSBC
Target
U.S. Bank
USAA Savings
Wells Fargo
America First CU
Boeing Employees (BECU)
Digital Federal CU
Golden 1 CU
Navy Federal CU
Patelco CU
Penn. State Employees (PSECU)
Pentagon Federal CU
SchoolsFirst Federal CU
Suncoast Schools Federal CU
VyStar CU
Wescom CU
Bank Issuers Credit Union Issuers
Note: Due to limited availability of online application disclosures, only one of HSBC’s cards is included in the survey.
Other HSBC disclosures were not available until after personal identification, such as social security number, was
provided. Also, because of the limited information available on its Web site, Arizona Federal Credit Union was
excluded from the study despite being one of the 12 largest credit union issuers. We replaced it with Patelco Credit
Union, the next-largest credit union issuer by volume.
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The data set included nearly 400 consumer credit
card products offered by these top issuers. All cards
were visible on issuers’ websites and available for
review to the general public. For each issuer, every
Visa, MasterCard, American Express, and Discover
branded consumer credit card was reviewed,
including student cards but not including secured
or business cards.
The analysis is based on the contractual powers
of card issuers as provided in the application
disclosures that issuers are required by law to
provide to potential customers. Researchers coded
each set of disclosures into a database, accounting
for pricing terms (interest rates, fees), penalty
conditions (triggers for penalty pricing, applicable
cure periods), payment terms (application of
payments, grace periods), change in terms conditions
and so on. Data for July, 2009, in this report is based
on this analysis. Data for December, 2008, is based
on our previous report in which we conducted
a similar analysis of the top 12 bank issuers.51
In most cases, the application disclosures provide
complete information about the terms we reviewed.
In some cases, however, issuers provided only
incomplete information. For example, not all issuers
disclose terms of mandatory arbitration agreements
in the application disclosures. Therefore, we have
reported whether the application disclosure mentions
arbitration or not, but do not presume to know the
details of the agreements. Similarly, we have reported
whether the issuer has disclosed its contractual right
to impose penalty interest rate increases, or the
consumer’s contractual right to cure the penalty and
return to the originally agreed rate, but we do not
presume to know the full extent of an issuer’s policies
on the use of penalty pricing. This approach is
consistent with our viewpoint that consumers who
are shopping for credit cards should understand
their contractual rights and obligations before entering
into an agreement, and know where issuers have sole
discretion to decide important terms.
This report presents comparisons between credit
cards offered by the largest 12 bank issuers and
those from the largest 12 credit union issuers.
We understand that for some analytical purposes
a comparison between banks and credit unions
would require more statistical nuance to account
for the differences in size (the credit unions only hold
about 1 percent of outstandings versus 90 percent
for the banks), scope (demographics, credit profiles,
geography), general risk factors (credit unions often
offer cards that are tied to deposit accounts or in
conjunction with membership regimes that allow
for better risk control) and the like. Indeed, some
members of the banking community have cautioned
that providing simple comparisons between bank
and credit union credit cards may be misleading
if it is not controlled for these and other factors,
such as chargeoff rates.
However, our purpose in providing the comparison
is not to explain why banks have higher pricing or
include more punitive terms on their credit cards.
Rather, our purpose is to give useful comparative
pricing information for consumers and to suggest
possible benchmarking data for policymakers to
analyze as they see fit. The Credit Union National
Association has recently released data showing
that there are 92.4 million credit union members,
suggesting that these financial institutions’ products
are viable options for many Americans.52
1 Results from our December 2008 study are
summarized in The Pew Charitable Trusts, “Safe
Credit Card Standards: Policy Recommendations
for Protecting Credit Cardholders and Promoting
a Functional Marketplace” (March, 2009), available
at www.pewtrusts.org/our_work_detail.aspx?id=630.
Additional findings are included in issue briefs and
commentary available at
www.pewtrusts.org/creditcards.
2 For the Federal Reserve’s comments on “harmful”
and “unfair or deceptive” practices, see Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Office of
Thrift Supervision, Treasury and National Credit Union
Administration, “Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices,”
74 FR 18 (January 29, 2009) at p. 5498 et. seq.
3 Ibid.
4 See The Pew Charitable Trusts (March, 2009), supra
note 1.
5 For the text of the Credit CARD Act of 2009, see
Pub. L. 111-24 at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_public_laws&doc.
d=f.publ1024.111pdf. For a summary of the Act, see
Senate Banking Committee, “Summary: ‘The Credit
Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure
Act,’ The CARD Act of 2009,” (May 19, 2009), available
at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/
051909_CreditCardSummaryFinalPassage.pdf.
6 Most consumer protections under Title I of the Credit
CARD Act of 2009 are scheduled to take effect on
February 22, 2010. These include the prohibiting
retroactive rate increases (with few exceptions) and
double cycle billing, applying overlimit fee safeguards
such as requiring specific consumer opt-in before the
fee may apply, and requiring payments beyond the
minimum payment due to be applied first to high-rate
balances. Some protections have already become
effective (advance notice and notice of right to cancel
requirements). Other protections will not become
effective until August 22, 2010, including “reasonable
and proportional” penalty fee and charges rules, and
the requirement that issuers implement policies
allowing for the reduction of interest rates following
interest rate increases that are predicated on risk
factors. See Pub. L. 111-24.
7 Issuer size is based on total outstanding credit card
balances. Market data from Nilson, infra note 49. For
an explanation of how we selected issuers and what
issuers are included in the study, please see the
Methodology section of this report.
8 The Safe Credit Card Standards and related
information are available at www.pewtrusts.org/
creditcards. To date, Pew has submitted two letters
to the Federal Reserve commenting on its current
rulemaking efforts under the Credit CARD Act. See
Nick Bourke, “Reasonable and Proportional Rules
under Credit CARD Act of 2009 (Pub L. 111-24)” (The
Pew Charitable Trusts, June 25, 2009), available at
www.pewtrusts.org/news_room_detail.aspx?id=53840;
see also Nick Bourke, “Regulation Z; Docket No.
R-1364 (Interim Final Rule)” (The Pew Charitable
Trusts, September 21, 2009), available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/news_room_detail.aspx?id=
55149. Some of our comments are discussed within
this report. See the Policy Recommendations section
of this report for more discussion.
9 In preliminary findings from this survey, Pew found
that the median lowest advertised rate for bank issued
cards in July of 2009 was 11.99 percent per year.
Further analysis showed that rate to be 12.24 percent,
due to the action of minimum rate rule mechanisms
that allow issuers to advertise partially variable rates
that rise according to a third-party index, but cannot
fall below a fixed minimum rate. This minimum rate
requirement mechanism and its use are discussed
elsewhere in this paper. After accounting for
applicable minimum rate requirements on the
surveyed cards, we found that the median lowest
interest rate was 12.24 percent per year. A similar
review of our December 2008 data showed that
minimum rate requirements did not affect median
rates as determined in our original analysis.
10 Pew’s December 2008 survey found that median
lowest advertised purchase rates on cards from the
largest 12 banks ranged from 9.99 to 15.99 percent.
11 The Pew Charitable Trusts, March, 2009, at p. 2. As
the report noted, actual charges were likely far higher.
The repricing events on outstanding balances for the
affected accounts generated at least $10 billion in
additional interest charges from a sample of accounts
representing only 70 percent of outstanding balances.
The calculation was based on a review of credit card
issuer data supplied to the Federal Reserve by
Morrison & Foerster in conjunction with Argus
Information & Advisory Service.
12 Bank of America’s terms state that APRs will be
reduced “a minimum of two percentage points,
possibly as low as the previously applicable APR,”
after six consecutive on-time payments. We are aware
that some issuers may disclose additional information
about penalty rates in their cardholder agreements.
Unfortunately, none of the surveyed banks would
provide us with cardholder agreements when we
requested them. Though some credit unions made
the agreements available to us, a thorough review
was not possible.
13 The Federal Reserve and other banking regulators
determined that “applying an increased annual
percentage rate to an outstanding balance causes
substantial consumer injury.” To help offset that injury,
their rules against unfair or deceptive acts or practices,
announced in December 2008 for enactment on July
1, 2010, would have prohibited any penalty interest
rate increase, including those triggered by overlimit
conditions, except when an account becomes 30 days
past due. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Office of Thrift Supervision, Treasury and
National Credit Union Administration, “Unfair or
Deceptive Acts or Practices,” 74 FR 18 (January 29,
2009) at p. 5498 et. seq. The Credit CARD Act of 2009,
passed in May of this year, superseded the Federal
Reserve guideline by enacting a more stringent
restriction, with penalty rate increases on existing
balances prohibited unless an account is 60 days or
more past due. See Pub. L. 111-24.
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14 When estimating annual interest charges per $1,000
borrowed, we use a simple interest calculation based
on an average daily balance of $1,000.
15 Bourke (June 25, 2009), supra note 8, at p. 18.
16 Source: Wells Fargo Visa Platinum application
disclosures taken from the Wells Fargo website,
July 9, 2009.
17 Our December 2008 survey found that 93 percent of
surveyed bank cards, including all but two fixed rate
cards, allowed the issuer to change the account
agreement or any interest rate at any time.
18 The current prime rate is published by the Wall Street
Journal, available at http://online.wsj.com/mdc/public/
page/mdc_bonds.html. Historical prime rates are
available from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/
PRIME.txt
19 Some products, including the majority of Barclaycard
bank credit cards, include tiered penalty fees but
stipulate that the maximum disclosed fee may apply
if an account is in a delinquency status. America First
credit union late fees were expressed as 5 percent of
the past due amount (i.e., the minimum required
payment), with a minimum of $10. We treated this fee
as a $10 fixed fee since the vast majority of accounts
would never be subject to a higher or a lower late fee.
20 For average balance per active account, see The Nilson
Report, Issue # 924 (April 2009). “Active accounts”
includes any account with a revolving balance that is
not paid off in full each month, and accounts that do
not carry a revolving balance but have had transaction
activity in the past 30 days.
21 Twenty-seven of Capital One’s 28 cards used a
cardholder’s credit limit (as opposed to outstanding
balance) to determine the overlimit fee.
22 74 FR 18 (January 29, 2009) at p. 5512 et. seq.
23 For the Federal Reserve’s comments on “harmful” and
“unfair or deceptive” practices, see Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System et. al., supra note 2.
Note that Section 105 of the Credit CARD Act of 2009
restricted how non-penalty fees could be financed on
certain types of accounts but did not substantively
regulate how those fees could be applied.
24 Source: Washington Mutual Customer Account
Statement, March 2007. (JPMorgan Chase acquired
Washington Mutual in 2008).
25 Among all issuers that disclosed a mandatory binding
arbitration requirement, Discover was the only one
that indicated a cardholder right to opt out of the
requirement when opening the account.
26 Maria Aspan, “Bank of America Ends Mandatory
Arbitration,” American Banker (August 14, 2009).
27 National Arbitration Forum, “The National Arbitration
Forum to Cease Administering All Consumer Arbitrations
in Response to Mounting Legal and Legislative
Challenges” (July 19, 2009), available at
http://www.adrforum.com/newsroom.aspx?&itemID=1
528&news=3
28 American Arbitration Association, “AAA Announces
Moratorium on Consumer Debt Collection Arbitration
Cases” (July 27, 2009), available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=36432.
29 See, e.g., Maria Aspan, “Law Hits Home as Cards Opt
out of Overlimit Fees,” American Banker, August 10,
2009. See also American Express, “How the New
Credit Card Law Will Affect You” American Express
Consumer Resources, available at
https://www212.americanexpress.com/dsmlive/dsm/d
om/us/en/cardlegislativewebpage/cardlegislativeweb
page.do?vgnextoid=351ffca121452210VgnVCM10000
0defaad94RCRD. As of July, both American Express
and Discover included overlimit fees on most of their
cards. As discussed in the Fees section of this report,
the four issuers that did not include overlimit fees in
any surveyed credit cards were Pennsylvania State
Employees’ Credit Union, Schools First Federal Credit
Union, Target and USAA.
30 The Pew Charitable Trusts (March, 2009), supra note 1.
31 The manager of Pew’s Safe Credit Cards Project, Nick
Bourke, recently testified in front of the House
Financial Services Committee on the need for faster
implementation of the Credit CARD Act. Bourke’s
written testimony is available at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_
dem/fchrCC_100809.shtml.
32 See Bourke (June 25, 2009) and Bourke (September
21, 2009), supra note 8.
33 Note that the Credit CARD Act requires issuers to
provide a six-month cure period for penalty interest
rates, but only if the cardholder resumes on-time
payment immediately when the penalty rate is
imposed. Because penalty rates can lead to dramatic
increases in the amount of the minimum monthly
required payment, many cardholders who cannot
resume on-time repayment immediately will remain
at risk. See the Interest Rates portion of this report
for more discussion.
34 See The Pew Charitable Trusts (March, 2009), supra
note 1.
35 Federal credit unions are subject to a maximum rate
cap of 18 percent annually, and many state-chartered
credit unions are subject to similar restrictions.
Interest rate caps found in these existing laws and
regulations will continue to apply once the Credit
CARD Act becomes effective.
36 Bourke (June 25, 2009), supra note 8, at p. 18.
See also pp. 10–13.
37 Bourke (June 25, 2009), supra note 8.
38 See, e.g., American Express, “How the New Credit
Card Law Will Affect You” American Express
Consumer Resources (“Effective October 1, 2009,
American Express will not charge an overlimit fee”),
available at https://www212.americanexpress.com/
dsmlive/dsm/dom/us/en/cardlegislativewebpage/car
dlegislativewebpage.do?vgnextoid=351ffca12145221
0VgnVCM100000defaad94RCRD. See also Aspan
(August 10), 2009.
39 For examples from California state law, see Cal Fin
Code § 4001. As we noted in our June comments
to the Federal Reserve, there is evidence of a “rent
extraction” or “rent seeking” problem associated
with penalty fees. See Bourke, (June 25), 2009, at p. 7.
40 Recently, a number of the largest banks announced
that they would create thresholds for overdraft fees
applicable to checking accounts, such as not charging
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a fee until an account is overdrawn by $5 or $10
(though multiple fees could apply, even within one
day). See, e.g., “Overdraft Fee Ease Won’t Stop Reg
Plan,” American Banker (September 24, 2009) at p.16.
Although these leniency periods are not as strong as
we have recommended for credit card overlimit fees,
the trend to respond to concerns about excessive
overdraft fees is encouraging.
41 For a discussion of the legislative goals underlying the
CARD Act of 2009, see, e.g., “Amending the Consumer
Protection Act, to Ban Abusive Credit Card Practices,
Enhance Consumer Disclosures, Protect Underage
Consumers, and for Other Purposes,” submitted by
Senate Banking Committee Chairman Chris Dodd,
May 4, 2009, available at http://www.thomas.gov/
cgi-bin/cpquery/T?&report=sr016&dbname=111&
(“The ‘Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and
Disclosure Act of 2009’ was developed to implement
needed reforms and help protect consumers by
prohibiting various unfair, misleading and deceptive
practices in the credit card market”).
42 Bourke (June 25, 2009), supra note 8, at pp. 9-13.
43 Bourke (September 21, 2009), supra note 8.
44 For a discussion of the legislative goals underlying
the CARD Act of 2009, see Dodd (May 4, 2009), supra
note 41.
45 See the Safe Credit Card Standards and related
information at www.pewtrusts.org/creditcards. See
also note 33, supra, for discussion of the six-month
cure period.
46 See, e.g., Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, January 29, 200, at p. 5561. Note that, with
the exception of the annual fees, we observed only a
small number of cards with fees matching this “fees
for the issuance or availability of credit” definition.
For example: all cards offered by U.S. Bank contained
a “closed account management fee” of $2.50. It is
unclear from the disclosure if this is a one-time fee
or charged on a monthly basis.
47 See Bourke (June 25, 2009), supra note 8, at p. 4.
48 For comments defending low-rate balance offers,
see e.g. Oliver Ireland, Statement to the U.S. House
of Representatives, Financial Services Committee,
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions. The Credit
Cardholders’ Bill of Rights: Providing New Protections
for Consumers, Hearing, March 13, 2008 (Serial110-
100), at p. 6. Available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/hearing110/ireland
031308.pdf. See also John Finneran, Statement to
the U.S House of Representatives, Financial Services
Committee, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions.
The Credit Cardholders’ Bill of Rights: Providing New
Protections for Consumers, Hearing, April 17, 2008
(Serial 110-109), at p. 7. Available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/hearing110/capital_
one.pdf.
49 For more on the Bank of America announcement,
see Aspan, (August 14, 2009). A bill currently under
consideration in both Houses of the U.S. Congress,
the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, addresses the
arbitration issue. The bill, introduced in April 2009,
would declare that no pre-dispute arbitration
agreement is enforceable if it requires arbitration
of a consumer dispute.
50 The Nilson Report Issue #918 (January 2009), Issue
#919 (February 2009), and Issue #924 (April 2009).
51 See The Pew Charitable Trusts (March, 2009), supra
note 1.
52 Credit Union National Association, “Monthly
Credit Union Estimates”(August 2009), available
at http://advice.cuna.org/download/mcue.pdf.
